DESIGNING TRUTHFUL SPECTRUM DOUBLE
AUCTIONS WITH LOCAL MARKETS
ABSTRACT:
Market-driven
spectrum auctions offer an efficient way to improve spectrum utilization by
transferring unused or under-used spectrum from its primary license holder to
spectrum-deficient secondary users. Such a spectrum market exhibits strong
locality in two aspects: 1) that spectrum is a local resource and can only be
traded to users within the license area, and 2) that holders can partition the
entire license areas and sell any pieces in the market. We design a spectrum
double auction that incorporates such locality in spectrum markets, while
keeping the auction economically robust and computationally efficient. Our
designs are tailored to cases with and without the knowledge of bid distributions.
Complementary simulation studies show that spectrum utilization can be
significantly improved when distribution information is available. Therefore,
an auctioneer can start from one design without any a priori information, and
then switch to the other alternative after accumulating sufficient distribution
knowledge. With minor modifications, our designs are also effective for a
profit-driven auctioneer aiming to maximize the auction revenue.
EXISTING SYSTEM:
In
order to utilize such idle channels and to improve their utilization, it is
critical to design sufficient incentives that encourage primary license holders
to allow other spectrumdeficient users to access these channels. It is
intuitive to observe that under-used channels have values that can be efficiently
determined by a market, governed by spectrum auctions. If designed well, a
spectrum auction offers an efficient way to create a market: it attracts both
license holders and wireless users to join, and to either buy o sell idle channels in the market. Once a
transaction is conducted, the seller (license holder) earns extra income by
leasing unused channels to the buyer (wireless user), who pays to obtain the
channel access.
DISADVANTAGES OF
EXISTING SYSTEM:
v Spectrum
auctions are designed in the sense of the global market all channels are
accessible to all users, no matter where they are.
v District
extends Myerson’s virtual valuations to double auctions and designs a market
with a discriminatory pricing policy — different auction winners might face
different charges or payments.
PROPOSED
SYSTEM:
We
present District, a set of new spectrum double auctions that are specifically
designed for local spectrum markets. With District, a license holder can freely
partition its entire license area and either sell or reserve spectrum in local
markets, based on their own requirements. Moreover, District allows the same
channel to be shared by multiple wireless users if no interference occurs. We believe that it is
crucial for District to maintain basic properties of economic robustness
(truthfulness in particular). As a matter of fact, introducing the notion of
local markets imposes non-trivial challenges when economic robustness is to be
maintained.
ADVANTAGES OF PROPOSED
SYSTEM:
v
However, all works above discuss auction
designs in the sense of global markets, where all channels to be auctioned off
is globally accessible to all spectrum buyers, no matter where they are.
v
Such ignorance of the geographic
locality of spectrum resources made them incapable to accommodate he demand of
the recent push of database-driven spectrum markets, in which channels are
traded to local users within the seller-defined license area.
SYSTEM CONFIGURATION:-
HARDWARE REQUIREMENTS:-
Processor - Pentium –IV
Speed - 1.1 Ghz
RAM - 512 MB(min)
Hard Disk - 40 GB
Key Board - Standard Windows Keyboard
Mouse - Two or Three Button Mouse
Monitor - LCD/LED
SOFTWARE
REQUIREMENTS:
Operating
system : Windows XP.
Coding
Language : .Net
Data
Base : SQL Server 2005
Tool : VISUAL STUDIO 2008.
REFERENCE:
YWei Wang,
Student, Ben Liang, Senior, and Baochun Li, Senior _,
“Designing Truthful Spectrum Double
Auctions with Local Markets” IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON MOBILE COMPUTING, VOL. 13,
NO. 1, Jan 2014
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